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Abstract 
Most incomes underlie some risk, i.e. ex ante they can be regarded as a lottery ticket. 
In every society,  the lucky winners of this lottery compensate unlucky losers 
(unemployed workers or bankrupt entrepreneurs) privately and/or by public 
insurances. Do voluntary solidarity payments depend on the amount and origin of risk 
of winners and losers? We differentiate between people with riskless incomes (civil 
servants),  with low risk incomes (workers),  and with high risk  incomes 
(entrepreneurs). Some of our subjects had no choice of their risk class (civil servants 
and some workers), some of them had the choice to be a worker or an entrepreneur. 
The main stylized results are: (i) Civil servants and lucky workers with and without a 
choice transfer similar shares of their income to unlucky workers, but (ii) discriminate 
against unlucky entrepreneurs. (iii) Lucky entrepreneurs give about the same share 
of their income to unlucky workers as lucky workers do and (iv) do not significantly 
discriminate.  (v) The potential solidarity  payments are  not an  incentive for taking 
higher risks.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
Most incomes underlie some risk, i.e. ex ante they can be regarded as a lottery ticket. 
In every society, there are voluntary private solidarity transfers from the lucky winners 
of the lottery  to the unlucky losers and  in developed countries  there are  public 
schemes which help people without income. In this paper we ask whether voluntary 
solidarity payments depend on the amount and the  origin of risk of winners and 
losers. We differentiate between people with riskless incomes (civil servants), with 
low risk incomes (workers), and with high risk incomes (entrepreneurs). Of course, 
risk may have other sources than the type of job one fills. Health, for example, is 
another important determinant for income and welfare. Some people may have the 
impression that they never had a choice to influence the risk class they are in. Others 
know that they had the chance, and they had consciously decided one way or the 
other. When people make a decision about helping a needy person from their 
neighborhood or when they decide via elections about public unemployment 
compensation, welfare payments, and health insurances they may differentiate their 
help according to the risk class and according to the question whether the risk class 
was chosen voluntarily. The latter is not always possible, at least not with objective 
criteria (though smoking or striving for a career as an artist is an objective clue). In 
personal relations it is the impression of the benefactor which counts. 
 
An environment with risky incomes and solidarity is ideally described by the Solidarity 
Experiment of Selten and Ockenfels (1998) which has meanwhile been replicated 
and varied several times (Ockenfels and Weimann, 1999; Büchner et al., 2007; Trhal 
and Radermacher, 2009; Bolle et al., 2012; Brosig et al., 2009; Costard and Bolle, 
2011). In the original Solidarity Game there is a group of three players. Each player is 
independently  endowed with €10  with  a probability of 2/3 and with €0 with a 
probability of 1/3. If there are winners and losers in a group the winners can transfer 
money to the losers. The majority of subjects in Solidarity Experiments are willing to 
send positive money transfers to the victims of bad fate. In the above terms, the 
original Solidarity game has only workers without a choice of their lottery ticket. 
 
A simpler environment with solidarity payments is the two-person  Dictator game 
which has often been used to investigate the influence of social proximity, 3 
 
communication, and property rights (from working for one’s income). Often, however, 
a group of three allows the investigation of more differentiated questions. In the one-
loser case of the Solidarity game, for example, it may be asked whether the (known 
or expected) contributions of the other winner increases or decreases  a winner’s 
transfer to the loser
1. For our investigation, it can be interesting whether a winner 
who is confronted with two different losers discriminates between them. 
 
Our investigation has connections with all kinds of distribution experiments and with 
the norms of redistribution which are discussed in those studies. The question how 
income transfers should be related to ex ante behavior of income creation is related 
to the general discussion about fairness standards and responsibility for oneself
2 
(Roemer, 1998). Konow (2000), Frohlich et al. (2004), Cappelen et al. (2007) and 
Tungodden et al. (2010) investigate behavior  in  Dictator experiments with a 
production phase preceding the distribution phase. Buitrago et al. (2009) use a 
variant of the Samaritan’s Dilemma to find behavioral standards of helping behavior. 
  
More important for our problem, however, is the small number of papers which is 
explicitly concerned with ex ante choices of individual risk and the redistribution of ex-
post income
3.  These are Thral and Rademacher (2009) and Costard and Bolle 
(2011), who conduct experiments with variants of the Solidarity game, and Cappelen 
et al. (2010) where members of a two-person group can choose between a risky and 
a riskless income and where the aggregate ex-post income may be redistributed by 
one of the group members or by a “spectator” without own interests. The results of 
the three papers will be compared in Section IV with the results of this investigation.  
 
In our experimental investigation we introduce, in addition to workers,  also civil 
servants (riskless income) and entrepreneurs (twice the income of a worker with half 
of the probability). Of course, in the experiment they were not called civil servants or 
workers or entrepreneurs. Some of the subjects had no choice of their risk class (civil 
servants and some workers) and some of them had the choice to be a worker or an 
                                            
1 Different social utility functions can imply a positive or negative or no influence of the other winner’s 
transfer. For a theoretical and empirical investigation of this question see Bolle et al. (forthcoming). 
2 To be distinguished from responsibility for others. For an experimental investigation of the latter see 
Bolle and Vogel (2011). 
3 A complementary problem is discussed by Brock et al. (2010), namely redistribution by transferring 
lottery tickets instead of riskless money. 4 
 
entrepreneur. In contrast to all the other experiments ours is conducted in a virtual 
world  (EVE online). The main stylized results are:  (0) The basic Solidarity Game 
shows the same results in the virtual world as in the classroom/ laboratory. (i) Civil 
servants and workers with and without a choice act similarly towards unlucky 
workers, but (ii) discriminate against unlucky entrepreneurs. (iii) Lucky entrepreneurs 
give about the same share of their income to unlucky workers as lucky workers do 
and (iv) do not significantly discriminate. (v) The potential solidarity payments are not 
an incentive for taking higher risks (moral hazard). (vi) Living in a country with a 
communist history does not influence the amount of solidarity. (vii) Risk preferences 
and personality have some influence on the choice of the high risk income.
  
 
As far as we know (i) is a new result. (ii) has been observed, though only for workers 
who had a choice  by Costard and Bolle (2011)
4 and, with other risk classes than we 
use, by Trhal and Radermacher (2009) and Cappelen (2010). (iii) and (iv) contradict 
Trhal and Radermacher  (2009) and are only in weak accordance with Cappelen et 
al. (2010). (iv) does not significantly replicate Costard and Bolle (2011) who found 
that entrepreneurs discriminate in favor of unlucky entrepreneurs. (v) is a bit 
surprising because there is much evidence of moral hazard in the lab (e.g. Cox et al., 
1996, for cost sharing contracts) as well as in the field (e.g. Edelberg, 2003, for 
consumer loans). (vi) contradicts studies of  Ockenfels and Weimann (1999) and 
Brosig et al. (2010). (vii) is not very surprising but, together with (0) it may serve to 
strengthen the trust in our virtual world experiment. 
 
Virtual worlds such as World of Warcraft, Second Life, and EVE online constitute an 
interesting new environment for experiments. With small costs it is possible to reach 
alternative samples of subjects and though these virtual worlds are inhabited mostly 
by young male individuals they may offer more variation
5 than the narrow student 
subject pool of most other economic experiments. Transaction costs are small, for 
the participant as well as for the experimenter, because all interaction takes place 
                                            
4 The present paper is a follow-up investigation which, first, tries to replicate (mainly successfully) the 
results of Costard and Bolle (2010) for another subject pool, and which, second, introduces more 
player types, investigates moral hazard, relates the choice of high risk income with other traits, and 
looks for evidence of a “myth” about an effect on solidarity from being raised in an ex-communist 
region.  
5 At least the virtual world sample provided us with a sample of mainly non-students and with 
participants from all regions of Germany (necessary for result (vii)), while our university subjects are 
mostly regional students.   5 
 
from one’s home or office PC. The disadvantage of experiments in a virtual world is a 
certain  loss of control.  For example, one has to avoid participation of the same 
individual with multiple virtual selves. Another issue is the trust of the participants in 
the experimenter’s honesty and willingness to pay the promised rewards. Contrary to 
classroom/laboratory experiments the experimenter does not have a reputation (as a 
member of her university) and there is no authority for claims. Otherwise, questions 
of internal and external validity are similar to those in conventional experiments. 
 
An  important  example of virtual world experiments is Chesney et al. (2009) who 
conducted Ultimatum, Dictator, Public Good, Minimum Effort and Guessing Game 
experiments in Second Life. By and large, they reproduce the results of traditional 
experiments.  Further experiments have been conducted by Spann et al.  (2008, 
Dictator Game in World of Warcraft), Atlas and Putterman (2009), Fiedler and Haruvy 
(2009), Füllborn et al. (2009), all investigating the Trust Game/Investment Game in 
Second  Life.  Nicklisch and Salz (2008) investigated a Gift Exchange (wages and 
effort) experiment in World of Warcraft. Fiore et al. (2008) investigate a Public Goods 
game in an environmental framework. Again there were no major differences 
between student subjects in laboratories and virtual world subjects. Our topic, the 
Solidarity Game, has not been investigated in the virtual world.  
 
In Section 2 we describe our experiments, in Section 3 we report the results, and in 
Section 4 we discuss our results and relate them in particular to the results of Trhal 
and Radermacher (2009), Cappelen et al. (2010), and Costard and Bolle (2011).  
 
2.  The Experiments  
 
We differentiate between the following lottery tickets and types of players (situations): 
 
Lottery tickets:  
-   A  yields mISK
6  100 with prob = 2/3, 0 with prob = 1/3 
-   B  yields mISK 200 with prob = 1/3, 0 with prob = 2/3 
 
Players (situations): 
                                            
6 ISK is the EVE online currency. While the experiment was conducted one could buy the currency 
with an exchange rate of about 21 mISK/€.   6 
 
-  C-players have a completely certain income of mISK 100.  
-  CA-players hold a lottery ticket A; they had no choice of lotteries. 
-  A-players had the choice between lottery tickets A and B and have chosen A. 
-  B-players had the choice between lottery tickets A and B and have chosen B.  
 
AC-losers,  A-losers,  and B-losers  were unlucky and received  0 from their  lottery 
ticket. AC-winners,  A-winners,  and B-winners  were lucky  and received their 
respective prize. 
 
The first phase of our experiment consisted of recruiting experimental subjects. The 
experiment was announced in official EVE online forums. Applicants were informed 
that the experiment would be in German and they were required to fill a register form 
with (virtual world) name, age, gender, and home country (in the case of Germany 
also Bundesland). In order to make double play costly, new applicants with the same 
IP address as a former applicant were not accepted. Another 14 applicants were 
eliminated because we had the suspicion that their knowledge of German was not 
satisfactory. We carried out our experiments with 332 applicants who were randomly 
distributed on the following four experiments. In addition to further payments every 
participant received a “show up” fee of mISK 10. 
 
In Experiment 1 (72 subjects) the original Solidarity Game was replicated with lottery 
A. The three AC-players decided about their transfers as winners before the lottery 
ticket A had materialized in an income of mISK 0 or mISK 100 (as in Selten and 
Ockenfels, 1998).  This  strategy method  is used also in all other experiments.  A 
comparison with former classroom and laboratory experiments served to detect (or 
not) differences in the results which should be appropriated to differences between 
the subject pools and/or the environment. 
 
In Experiment 2 (110 subjects) one of the three members of a group received  a 
certain income of mISK 100, while the other two members had a lottery ticket A. All 
players  decided  about their transfers, the C-player unconditionally,  the two AC 
players  conditional on being winners.  This experiment should tell us whether 




In Experiment 3 (114 subjects) again one of the three subjects got a certain income 
of mISK 100. The other two subjects had the choice of lottery tickets A or B. This 
experiment should tell us whether risky choices B are “punished” with less solidarity. 
Note that players knew when they chose A or B that there would be a “solidarity 
phase” after the realization of lottery tickets income.  
 
In Experiment 4 (36 subjects) the participants had the choice between A and B but 
without any solidarity payments. The comparison of the frequency of B choices in 
Experiments 3 and 4 indicates whether there is a moral hazard problem in 
Experiment 3, namely that many subjects chose the risky choice B because they felt 
“insured” by the expected solidarity of their group. 
 
It is important that the participants trust in the ability and willingness of the 
experimenter to pay them and in the unbiasedness of the random mechanism which 
determined their income (for those who received a lottery ticket). The first issue is 
solved by the transfer of bn ISK 30 to the custodian Chribba who is known in the EVE 
online world. The Chribba institution also manages a dice tool (used for professional 
lotteries in EVE). The dice tool carried out a random draw for every participant. The 
participants could see the date and the result of this random draw after visiting 
Chribba. 
 
In addition to the decisions in Experiments 1 to 4, every participant  reported 
expectations with respect to the decisions of others and filled a questionnaire asking 
for personal data as age, gender and description of their virtual world character (all 
this is not analyzed here), the “paired lotteries” questionnaire for the measurement of 
risk aversion (Holt and Laury, 2002),  and a personality questionnaire 16 PA 
(Brandstätter, 1988). In the Appendix, we provide as an example the English 
translation of the instructions for Experiment 3. The personality questionnaire  we 
used is to be found in Brandstätter (1988) and the risk questionnaire in Holt and 
Laury (2002). The German version of all instructions and questionnaires is provided 
in Lübbe (2010), where also some results about behavioral differences according to 
gender, etc. can be found. 
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3.  Results 
 
First of all, let us describe our subjects according to the restricted number of personal 
data we collected. 274 (83%) of the selected 332 applicants filled out all experimental 
questionnaires (with small variations over the experiments). 41 of these live in East 
Germany and 191 in West Germany. 98% of our participants are male which 
indicates that the sample is by no means representative for the general population
7. 
Ages reached from 15 to 52 years (mean value 28.0). From our question concerning 
education we can estimate that the student share was less than 10% and the share 
of subjects with a university degree was about 12%. Therefore our subject pool is 
certainly different from the usual (economics) student population. 
 
III.1 Do students and inhabitants of EVE online behave similarly? 
 
Experiment 1 was a replication of the original Solidarity Game and served to confirm 
the comparability of our subjects from the virtual world and the student subjects from 
“normal” economic experiments. Transfers in the one-loser case were on average 
22% of endowment and, in the two-loser case, 16% of endowment (to both losers). 
Selten and Ockenfels (1998) observed rather similar averages, namely 25% and 
16%.  
 
Result (0): In the original solidarity game, there are no significant differences between 
the behavior of EVE online subjects and those of Selten and Ockenfels (1998). 
 
III.2 Does solidarity depend on own and other’s risk and choice of risk? 
 
In Experiment 2 one of the members (type C) of a group got a riskless income
8 while 
the other two members (type CA) got a lottery ticket A. The  CA-players  had to 
indicate their transfers only for the one-loser case; C-players indicated transfers for 
the one- and the two-loser cases. The average transfers were rather similar, namely 
                                            
7 On the other hand, with 98% men we can be rather confident that we were provided with the real 
gender of our subjects and not with that of atavars where gender swapping (mainly men pretending to 
be women, see Hussain and Griffiths, 2008; Huh and Williams, 2009) is relatively frequent. 
8 C-players are in the same situation as the dictators in Dictator experiments. If they are aware that 
they got their position randomly then the only difference to CA-players is that they decide 
unconditionally because they know already that they are winners. 9 
 
21.5% by C-players and 22.5% by CA-players (22.0% by the CA-players in 
Experiment 1). 
 
 In Experiment 3, again one of the members received a riskless income C. The other 
two members had the choice of a lottery ticket A or B. Types A and B determined 
transfers only in the one-loser case, type C in the one- and two-loser cases. 42 of 63 
(66.7%)  who had the choice chose lottery A.  This  percentage  seems to be 
surprisingly small compared with a similar choice in Cappelen et al. (2010) where 
more than 90% decided for the less risky alternative. There is, however, a crucial 
difference between the choice situations. A and B are both risky lotteries with the 
same expectation value, while  Cappelen et al. (2010) let their subjects decide 
between a riskless and a risky lottery ticket (in the above comparison also with the 
same expectation value). The different results illustrate the well known certainty bias 
(e.g. Cohen and Jaffray, 1988). Another reason for the many risk seekers in this 
experiment could have been the “insurance” by expected solidarity payments. As 
announced already, this will be excluded by result (v). 
 
C-players,  A-winners, and AC-winners  behave similarly. On average, in the one-
winner case (Table 1), they give A-losers between 17.2% and 20.6% of their income 
and  they  all  discriminate significantly against  B-losers  who get only  11.9% and 
14.7%. In the two-loser case (Table 2), CA-winners from Experiment 1 gave about 
the same amount  to both CA-losers (16.0%) as  C-players in Experiment 2 did 
(15.4%). The discrimination of the C-players against B-losers is particularly visible in 
the two-loser case of Experiment 3 (Table 2) where A-losers receive on average 
18.8% of the C-player’s endowment while B-losers receive only 13.5%. 
 
B-winners’ solidarity towards A-losers (17% of their income), is nearly as strong (not 
significantly different) as that of A-winners, AC-winners, and C-players. In absolute 
terms B-winners transfer double as much as the others. They are different insofar as 
they show nearly as much solidarity with B-losers (giving 19% of their income) as 
with A-losers (17%, Table 1). This implies that they give significantly more to B-losers 
than the other players do. The “asymmetric” solidarity which is expressed by these 
results will be discussed in the last section of this paper. 
 10 
 
Table 1: Transfers (percentage of income) x1 in the one-loser case. 
 *(**) significantly different from transfers to A-losers according to Wilcoxon matched-
pairs signed-rank tests, 5% level (1% level). + significantly different from transfers by 
C-types and A-winners to B-losers according to a Mann-Whitney U-test, 5 % level. 




  Exp.2  Exp. 3  Exp. 1  Exp. 2  Exp. 3  Exp. 3 
to CA-
losers 
21.5  -  22.0  22.5  -  - 
to A-
losers 








Table 2: Transfers (percentage of income) x2 in the two-loser case.  
In Experiment 3 averages of the cases two A(B) losers and one A-/one B-loser. 
 § = significantly less than to A-losers (Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank tests, 
p<0.001) 
Transfers  by C-players  by CA-winners 
  Exp. 2  Exp. 3  Exp. 1 
to CA-losers  15.4  -  16.0 
to A-losers  -  18.8  - 
to B-losers  -  13.5
§  - 
 
Results: Players in the Solidarity Game seem to separate into two groups: the low 
risk group (low income without risk or with mandatory low risk or with chosen low risk) 
and the high risk group (high income with high risk). (i) Players of the low risk group 
transfer similar amounts to low risk losers (about 17.2% to 22.5% of income in the 
one loser case), but (ii) discriminate against high risk losers who get significantly less. 
(iii) High risk winners give nearly the same share of their income as low risk winners 
to low risk losers but (iv) do not significantly discriminate. Their transfers to high risk 




III.3 Do East Germans show less solidarity than West Germans? 
 
Ockenfels and Weimann (1999) and Brosig et al. (2010) find East German students 
to show significantly less solidarity than West German students. We do not replicate 
such differences in EVE online. On the contrary, our East German subjects (defined 
by current residence) seem to be a bit (though not significantly) more generous than 
their West German co-citizens (see Table 3). The experiments are not completely 
comparable (different subjects, different environment, different definition of being 
“East” or “West”),  which  may explain  the large differences between  the East 
contributions and between the West contributions of the studies. Nonetheless our 
results show that we have to be cautious when comparing East/West German 
patterns of behavior. In particular, general conclusions on the perpetual influence of 
socialistic culture need a broader empirical basis. 
 
Table  3:  Comparison of east and west German subjects’ solidarity measured by 
percentage of endowment sent to losers.  Xk(N)= transfer to k  loser(s), k=1, 2. 
N=number of subjects. 
  Ockenfels and 
Weimann (1999) 
Brosing et al. 
(2010) 
EVE online  EVE online  
 
  Treatment 1  Treatment 1  Treatment 1  all treatments 
  x1(N)  x2(N)  x1(N)  x2(N)  x1(N)  x2(N)  x1(N)  x2(N) 

































Result (v): East and West German inhabitants of EVE online do not differ significantly 
with respect to their solidarity transfers. 
 
III.4 Are risky choices due to moral hazard?  
 
Did B-players dare to choose the risky lottery only on the background of the expected 
solidarity of other group member? The lower transfers of the low income players to B-
losers may be partly caused by such a suspicion. The question whether B-types 12 
 
reveal moral hazard behavior  is investigated by comparing Experiment 3 with 
Experiment 4 where subjects could choose between lotteries A and  B without a 
subsequent phase of solidarity transfers. The plain result is that lottery A is chosen 
with the same frequency in both experiments, namely 66.7% in Exp. 3 and 69.7% in 
Exp. 4. 
 
Result  (vi):  High risk  choices are independent of the “insurance” by the solidarity 
group. 
 
III.5 Are risky choices due to general risk preferences? Are risky choices supported 
by certain personality traits? 
 
General risk preferences were measured with a proposal of Holt and Laury (2002). 
Subjects had to decide for 10 probabilities p between a low risk option L=(mISK  16 
with p, mISK 20 with 1-p) and a high risk option H=(mISK 1 with p, mISK 38.5 with 1-
p), p=0, .1, ..., .9. A risk neutral subject should choose L four times (for p=.6, .7, .8, 
.9). Thus subjects who choose L less than four times are called risk loving, those who 
choose exactly four times L are called risk neutral, and those who choose L more 
than 4 times are called risk averse. The number of choices of L is a measure of risk 
aversion. As in Holt and Laury (2002) one of the choices is selected randomly and 
paid according to the outcome of the lottery. 
 
Those who chose B in Experiment 3 (4) chose L on average 5.29 (5.30) times, those 
who chose A showed more risk aversion also according to the Holt & Laury measure, 
namely 6.57 (6.17) times. Both differences are significant in a Mann-Whitney U-test 
with p<.01. Note that even those who chose B are on average risk averse according 
to the Holt & Laury measure.  
 
Brandstätter (1988) develops a simplified personality test which relies on a subject’s 
self-evaluation with respect to 32  pairs  (right and left)  of attributes.  On a scale 
between -4 and +4 the subjects have to indicate to which extent the left or the right 
attribute applied. According to factor loadings derived by Brandstätter (1988), values 
of five factors (self-control, emotional stability, independence, tough-mindedness, 
extroversion) are determined. 13 
 
 We find that, in Experiment 3, B-types  show more emotional stability  and more 
independence than A-types (Mann-Whitney U-test, p<.05). Perhaps due to the lower 
number of subjects, we find no significant differences in Experiment 4. Beyond these 
plausible differences we find similar personality traits for A-and B-types. 
 
Result (vii): The choice of the high risk/ high income lottery B is negatively correlated 
with a measure of risk aversion. B-types show more independence and more 
emotional stability than A-types. 
 
3. Solidarity theory 
The structure of solidarity transfers can be explained by a social utility function 
suggested by Cappelen et al. (2010) and generalized by Costard and Bolle (2011). In 
the one winner/two losers case i’s utility Vi is 
 




j i i i 2 / ) ( 2 / ) (
2 ) ( 2 ) ( − − − − = β β γ . 
 
i y is the income which winner i reserves for himself and  j y  and  h y  are the losers’ 
incomes, i.e. i’s transfers to them.  h j i y y y X + + =  is i’s prize (mISK100 or mISK200). 
 is a general and   is an individual positive parameter. 
) ( j k F  is an individual fairness 
standard for j’s income which can take one of three forms. For a share   of the 
population the ex post standard “equality of income”, i.e.  3 /
) ( X F F
EP j k = =   is 
assumed to be fair; for a share   it is the ex ante standard “equality of opportunity” 
(everybody has the same options)  with 
EP EA EA j k F X f F F < = = *
) ( . For a share 
 a conditional fairness standard applies: 
EP F  is fair if i and j both 
“have chosen the same lottery ticket”  and 
EP CE CE j k F X f F F < = = *
) (   is fair 
otherwise. For this investigation we define “choice of the same lottery ticket” as a= 
“having no choice or choosing A” and b=“having a choice and choosing B”. a-players 
and b-players with a conditional fairness norm show in-group favouritism. The social 
utility function yields the forecast  
 











− =  14 
 
and correspondingly for loser h.  3 / 1 /
) ( or f or f X F
CE EA j k =  implies that the in-group 
transfers of a-players and b-players (as shares of their prize) should be the same. 
Also the out-group transfers should be the same. In-group transfers should be larger 
than out-group transfers. In the last section, all these relations have been shown to 
apply with the only exception that b-players (B-winners) do not give significantly more 
to b-players than to a-players (A-losers).  
 
 If there is one loser j and a second winner h then, from i’s point of view, 
 




j i i i i 2 / ) ( 2 / ) (
2 ) ( 2 ) ( − − − − = β β γ  
 
h i i j i t E t y E + =  is the loser’s expected income after i’s transfer  i t  and h’s expected 
transfer  h Et . When only C and CA players are present, i.e. in Experiments 1 and 2, 
X  is mISK 200, in Experiment 3 (where one player is a C-player) every A- or B-
winner knows that the C-player must be the second winner, i.e.  X  is i’s lottery prize 
plus mISK 100. Only for the C-player in Experiment 3  X  has to be estimated. If C-
player i  guesses the share of A-players to be  i α  then the conditional probability that 
the only other winner is an A-player is  ) 1 /( 4 i i i α α δ + = .  The C-player expects 
) 200 * ) 1 ( 100 * 100 ( i i mISK X δ δ − + + = . 
 
i’s maximization of (3) yields 
 









X t β γ − − = . 
 
(4) should be regarded as i’s best reply in the game he plays with h. For  0 > i t  
expected contributions of h completely crowd out i’s own contributions. Therefore, 
under utility functions (3), the game between i and h has a Nash (under complete 
information) or Baysian equilibrium with fixed total but indeterminate individual 
contributions. This poses the question where the expectations  h it E  should come from 
and whether the elicited expectations  are those we need to know in (4). For a 15 
 
discussion of the question whether i’s transfer is determined by or determines i’s 
expectations  h it E  see Selten and Ockenfels (1998).  
 
If the relative expectations  X t E h i /  are the same over player classes and experiments 
then, after substituting the prize in Table 1 by the aggregate income X, the same 
relations should hold as indicated in Table 1 for the one winner/two losers case, but 
with X equal to the (expected) sum of both winners’ income. Table 3, however, shows 
that there are (significant) differences of expectations. B-winners significantly expect 
C-players to decide in favor of their group. A-winners expect the contrary and also C-
players expect the other players to decide in favor of A. This supports the 
conclusions from Table 1 because, according to (4), higher expected transfers for a 
group should crowd out the contributions to this group. In spite of this, also relative to 
X, B-winners give more to B-losers (12.7%) than to A-losers (11.1%) and A-winners 
and C-players give significantly (p<0.05) more to A-losers (10.3% and 7.4%) than to 
B-losers (7.4% and 5.2%). Thus we observe in-group favoritism also if transfers are 
measured relative to X. 
 
Table 3: Expectations of the other winner’s transfers as percentage of aggregate 
income  X  in the one-loser case. 
* Significantly different from expectations by C-players about transfers to A-losers 
and CA-losers (Mann-Whitney U-test, p<0.05). 
+  Significantly different from B-
winners’ expectations about transfers to A-losers (Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-











  Exp.2  Exp. 3  Exp. 1  Exp. 2  Exp. 3  Exp. 3 
CA-losers  10.7  -  8.2  8.8  -  - 
A-losers  -  8.7  -  -  9.3  6.6* 
B-losers  -  7.8









4.  Discussion and Conclusion 
 
The members of a society vary a lot with respect to the risk they take. Some would 
never give up their secure job for an opportunity to double their income in a young 
firm with an insecure fate; some would. Both types are insured by the same social 
insurance, but in case of bad fortune social insurance is not everything. The well-
being of the jobless depends to a great deal on how they are treated by their friends 
and family. Will someone who decided for greater risk and failed get less empathy 
and personal help than someone who did not “tempt fate”? Some people drive their 
cars more riskily than others; some are engaged in dangerous sports activities, some 
smoke and eat junk food, etc. Is there less pity for “self-inflicted harm” if those people 
are injured or get cancer? The question in such cases is: Who is ready to help 
whom?  
 
This question is answered by the results (i), (ii), (iii), and (iv) from above. We find 
always the same average transfers (about 20% of a winner’s income in the one-loser 
case), except from the no risk C-players and the low risk A-winners to the high risk B-
losers (only about 13% of the winners income). Let us now compare these results 
with other investigations of redistribution behavior. 
 
Trhal and Radermacher (2009) compare transfers in the original Solidarity Game ST 
(our experiment 1) with transfers in a game RT where all participants can choose 
between a completely safe option S of €10 (with prob = 1) and a risky option R (€0 
with prob = 0.5, €10 with prob = 0.4, €60 with prob = 0.1)
9. Contrary to our study, the 
winners did not know whether the receiver(s) of their transfers had chosen S or R, 
but  in RT losers  received  fewer transfers than in ST which is interpreted by the 
authors as a tendency not to reward self-inflicted harm. As all subjects took part in 
both experiments subjects in ST could be classified according to their choice in RT.  
Transfers in RT are lower than those in ST even from those who decided for risk 
themselves.  Our results significantly  contradict this indirect observation.  Note, 
however, that the order in which the experiments ST and RT are conducted is crucial: 
the differences between the S-players’ solidarity payments are much smaller if the 
                                            
9 The options are called A and B in Trhal and Radermacher (2009); they are relabelled here in order 
not to confuse them with our options A and B. 17 
 
games are played in the order RT-ST than in opposite order.  Possibly the self-image 
of the players develops only after they have decided in the RT game, and possibly 
only after the RT game has been played they are aware that, in the ST game, they 
are confronted with the same mixture of S- and R-players as in RT.  
 
Costard and Bolle (2010) give all three members of a group the choice between 
lottery A (€10 with prob = 2/3, €0 with prob = 1/3) and lottery B (€20 with prob = 1/3, 
€0 with prob = 2/3). They find that A-winners transferred more to A-losers than to B-
losers and that B-winners transferred more to B-losers that to A-losers.  Perhaps due 
to the different subject pool, the result of Costard and Bolle (2010) is only partly 
confirmed by our study. Our B-winners transferred only insignificantly more to the B-
losers than to the A-losers. 
 
Cappelen et al. (2010) give their subjects first a binary choice of either a riskless 
income or a lottery ticket. Then the ex-post aggregate income of two randomly 
matched subjects can be redistributed by one of them or by a spectator without own 
interests. Cappelen et al. (2010) find that the redistribution behavior of their subjects 
can be explained by social utility functions, one of which discriminates between risk 
seekers and risk averters. This is in principle supported by our experiment. There 
are, however, indications that risk seekers are different from risk-averters beyond 
their risk preferences, a question which has not been investigated by Cappelen et al. 
(2010). 
 
The  differences  between these four  studies  need not indicate a fundamental 
contradiction. It is more plausible that we still lack a consistent interpretation of the 
results of these experiments which vary a lot with respect to the experimental games 
and with respect to the subject pools. Explicit models (Cappelen et al., 2000) as well 
as behavioral rules as “less solidarity for self-inflicted harm” (Trhal and Radermacher, 
2009) or “risk preferences create group identity feelings” (Costard and Bolle, 2010) 
are possibly too much focused  on  single  experiments.  Perhaps a description of 
subjects in terms of personality characteristics (our result (vii)) may  help to 
understand their choice of individual risks as well as their redistribution decisions. 
The last remark shows that also “side results” may be rather important. The existence 
or, as in this investigation, the lack of moral hazard behavior (result (v)) may be an 18 
 
important condition for the winners’ willingness to help. Also for a political evaluation 
of public welfare schemes this aspect is rather important. 
 
 A (too easily generalized) finding that East Germans (who are raised in an ex-
communist region) show less solidarity than West Germans  (Ockenfels and 
Weimann, 1999; Brosig et al., 2009) contributes to  the image and self-image of 
people even if one does not believe in a strong impact of scientific studies. Our result 
(vi) casts considerable doubts on this finding which may perhaps be restricted to a 
student population. 
 
At last let us come back to the asymmetry of solidarity which is expressed in the 
results (i) to (iv). The high income B-winners give on average more than all other 
receivers of income. Expressed in terms of taxes they pay (on average) voluntarily 
progressive taxes on their ex post income. This casts a positive light on  the 
progressive taxation of income in nearly all developed countries. Under the inclusion 
of later solidarity payments the high risk players therefore have ex ante a smaller 
expected income than the low risk players. This raises the question of whether 
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Instructions for the two players in Treatment 3 who had the choice between Lottery A 
and Lottery B (the third player got a certain income of 100 mISK). 
 
 
Please read the following instructions carefully: 
In the following experiment your initial endowment (in million ISK, abbreviated: mISK) 
will be determined by random process of your choice: 
 
- Random process A: with a probability of 2/3 you win mISK 100, with a probability of 
1/3 you lose and get mISK 0. 
- Random process B: with a probability of 1/3 you win mISK  200, with a probability of 
2/3 you lose and get mISK 0. 
 
 As a compensation for participation every participant receives additional mISK 10 (if 
the questionnaire is completely filled out). 
 
Every participant of this experiment is a member of a group of three which will be 
randomly formed. The groups are anonymous, i.e. nobody is informed about the 
identity of the other members. 
 
The second member of your group can choose – as can you - between random 
processes A or B. Correspondingly he can – as can you – win or lose.  
 
The third member of your group is directly provided with mISK 100, without any 
random process. Therefore one of the three group members gets mISK 100 anyway. 
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Participant 1 (you): Random process A or B → Winner or loser 
Participant 2: Random process A or B → Winner or loser 
Participant 3: mISK 100 directly  
 
Before you know whether you have won or not you must decide whether and, if yes, 
how much money you would transfer to a loser in your group. 
The other group members make the corresponding decisions. 
 
If your group consists only of winners no money is transferred. If it turns out that you 
are a loser you get, in addition to your firm compensation of mISK 10, that amount of 
money which the winning group members have reserved for you. If you are a winner 
you get, in addition to your firm compensation of mISK 10, your initial endowment 
minus your transfer to the loser.  
 
Your compensation will be transferred to your EVE online account a few days after 
the end of the experiment. 
 
Which random process do you choose? 
- Random process A: with a probability of 2/3 you win mISK 100, with a probability 
of 1/3 you lose and get mISK 0. 
- Random process B: with a probability of 1/3 you win mISK 200, with a probability 
of 2/3 you lose and get mISK 0. 
Please choose: 
 
□ Random process  A  
□ Random process B  
 
What do you think which percentage of participants will choose A? Which percentage 
will choose B?  
The participant with the best estimate gets, in addition to his other payoffs, mISK 50.  
(in the case of several best estimates the mISK 50 will be equally distributed).  
I think that _____  of 100 will choose random process A.  
I think that _____  of 100 will choose random process B. 
 
 If you decided for A go to the page “Random process A”, if you decided for B 




[Page Random process  A, we do not report Random Process B because only one 
letter and one number are exchanged]  
 
Remember: 
- participants who chose random process A get mISK 100 with a probability of 2/3  
- participants who chose random process B get mISK 200 with a probability of 1/3 
- the third group member gets mISK 100 directly 
 
All participants are members of randomly selected groups of three. 
You have chosen random process A. For the following decisions imagine that you 
have won 100 mISK. Please indicate for all combinations of results in your group of 
three your decision. 
 
In your group there is one loser. How much do you give to the loser? 
 I: To a loser who had decided for random process A I give _________  
II: To a loser who had decided for random process B I give _________ 
 
Expectations with respect to the second group member: 
How much do you expect will other winners give on average in such a case? (The 
best estimation for every question will be rewarded with mISK 50.) 
On average I expect a loser who chose random process A to get _________  
On average I expect a loser who chose random process B to get _________  
 
Expectations with respect to the third group member:  
How much will the group member give, who received mISK 100 directly, if the loser 
chose random process A? (The best estimation will be rewarded with mISK 50.) 
CaseA-1: If there is one loser who has chosen random process A I expect him to get 
on average: ___  
Case A-2: If there are two losers who both chose random process A I expect both of 
them to get on average ____ 
How much will the group member give, who received mISK100 directly, if the losers 
chose random process B? (The best estimation will be rewarded with mISK 50.) 
Case B-1: If there is one loser who has chosen random process B I expect him to get 
on average: ___ 
Case B-2: If there are two losers who both chose random process B I expect both of 
them to get on average ____ 
How much will the group member give, who received mISK 100 directly, if there are 
two losers and one of the losers chose random process A and the other random 
process B? (The best estimation will be rewarded with mISK 50.) 
Case AB-A: I expect the one who chose random process A to get on average ____ 
Case AB-B: I expect the one who chose random process B to get on average ____ 
 
 
 